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Abstract
This paper analyzes the impact of inequality on growth when technical progress is driven by
innovations and consumers have hierarchic preferences. Inequality has an impact on growth
because it affects the structure and the dynamics of demand. Redistribution from very rich to
very poor consumers is beneficial for growth. In general, the growth effect depends on the
nature of redistribution. Due to a demand externality of R&D activites multiple equilibria are
possible.
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11. Introduction
This paper investigates the impact of income inequality on economic growth when technical
progress is driven by innovations and consumers have hierarchic preferences. When
consumers have hierarchic preferences the structure of demand is affected by the distribution
of income. Poor people concentrate most of their expenditures on basic needs, whereas richer
people direct their expenditures to more luxurious goods. The empirical relevance of a
hierarchic structure of demand is well documented: it is featured by ‘Engel’s law’ according
to which the expenditure share for food decreases with income.
When demand is affected by the income distribution, inequality may be an important
determinant of innovations and growth. The empirical importance of the inequality-growth
relationship has been emphasized recently. A number of studies have found a robust negative
correlation between growth rates and income inequality across countries (Persson and
Tabellini (1994), Alesina and Rodrik (1994), Clarke (1995) and the survey by Benabou
(1996)).
While recent research has extensively dealt with the question how income inequality
affects the long-run growth performance of economies, little attention has been paid to the
role of income distribution for the incentives to innovate.1 This is surprising given the
generally accepted view that innovations are an important source of economic development
and technical progress. In the standard Schumpeterian growth models income inequality plays
no role because consumers have homothetic preferences. By assumption, the level of demand
for the various goods - including the innovator’s product - does not depend on the income
distribution. While the assumption of homothetic preferences has turned out convenient in
incorporating monopolistic competition into a general equilibrium framework, it is highly
questionable from an empirical point of view. The vast majority of studies of consumer
2behavior reject the hypothesis of homothetic preferences (see Deaton and Muellbauer
(1980)).2
A hierarchy of wants implies that goods can be ranked according to their priority in
consumption. In this paper, hierarchic preferences are introduced in a stylized way. It is
assumed that goods are indivisible and consumers either buy or do not buy a certain good.
The utility of a consumer depends then on the number of different goods consumed. The level
of market demand for a specific good is affected by the distribution of income as this
determines how many consumers can afford it. In a dynamic context, hierarchic preferences
imply that inequality determines how the level of demand for a particular good evolves.
Today, the good of an innovator may be purchased only by a small group of rich people. But
as incomes grow the size of the market grows as less wealthy people also become willing to
buy. The novel aspect of this paper is to study how income distribution affects the time path
of demand for the innovator’s good and therefore the reward to an innovation.
As far as the supply side is concerned, the model captures the main features of the
standard innovation-driven growth models. In particular, it is assumed that each innovation
project increases the stock of public knowledge and thus the productivity level in the whole
economy. However, there are differences between the present model and the standard ones. In
the present model innovations are process innovations leading to more efficient production of
a particular consumption good. This differs from the model of Romer (1987, 1990)  where
innovators introduce new intermediate inputs which are then used by all final output
producers. In the present model, innovators drive less efficient producers (a competitive
fringe) out of the market, but are never displaced themselves. This is different from Aghion
and Howitt’s (1992) framework, where successive innovations take place within the same
market and the current innovator disappears with the next innovation.
As mentioned above, inequality affects growth because it affects the time path of
demand faced by an innovator. The underlying mechanisms can be illustrated by studying a
3population with two groups of consumers who differ in income. The analysis can easily be
extended to the general case. With two groups, the equilibrium can be characterized by one of
three different regimes. Regime (a) corresponds to a situation where initially only the rich buy
the good of an innovator, the poor do not purchase until later; in regime (b) both rich and poor
consumers immediately buy the innovator’s good; and in regime (c) neither the rich nor the
poor will buy the innovator’s good initially.
The distinction between these three scenarios helps to understand the inequality-
growth relationship. On the one hand, income distribution is a determinant of a particular
regime. When all incomes are equal, it is evident that only regime (b) or regime (c) are
possible, whereas regime (a) requires a sufficient unequal distribution. On the other hand, the
impact of changes in income distribution on the growth rate is different across the three
regimes. A possible impact of inequality comes from its effect on the time path of demand for
a product. In regime (a), inequality is harmful for growth. When income is concentrated
among a few the initial market for a new product is small; and with very poor consumers it
takes a long time until the size of the market becomes larger. This decreases the profitability
of an innovation. In regime (b), growth is independent of inequality. Demand for the good of
an innovator is already at its maximum when the new good is introduced. A change in the
distribution does not affect demand, so that the incentive to innovate and the growth rate
remain constant. Finally, in regime (c) inequality is beneficial for growth. Innovators are
better off in getting a small cash flow from the rich in the near future, as opposed to a large
cash flow later on.
An interesting aspect of regimes (a) and (c) is the possibility of multiple equilibria.
Two identical economies can end up in either a high- or in a low-growth regime. Multiplicity
is the result of a complementarity between present and future R&D activities. If the expected
future innovation rate and therefore the growth rate is high, current innovators can expect that
their own markets will grow more rapidly. This creates an incentive to conduct more R&D
4today. This complementarity between present and future innovators comes into play when
more growth leads to a more favorable time path of demand for an innovator and is supported
by the assumption of technological spillovers: more innovative activities lead to a higher
growth rate. In other words, a high innovation rate creates a demand externality. This
externality is clearly not present in regime (b) where all consumers buy the innovator’s good
as soon as (s)he enters the market. Since the market is fully developed a higher growth rate
does not change the time path of demand for an innovator. In regimes (a) and (c), however,
the demand for the innovator’s good expands over time and future profits depend on the
growth rate. In these two regimes the demand externality is at work and multiplicity can arise.
Multiple equilibria are the result of a coordination problem in which expectations determine
whether the economy experiences high or low growth.
The role of inequality and hierarchic preferences in the context of economic
development has been studied in a number of other papers. The present paper is related to that
of Murphy, Shleifer, and Vishny (1989a). Like in my model, they show that the adoption of
efficient methods of production requires large markets and excessive concentration of wealth
may be an obstacle to economic development. However, Murphy, Shleifer, and Vishny
(1989a) focus on a static framework. As a consequence, changes in income distribution matter
only if the demand of the marginal firm is affected. This is different from the present model
where not only the level but also the time path of demand affects growth. Moreover, the
equilibrium  in their model is always unique, whereas my model generates multiple
equilibria.3 Finally, their paper emphasizes on the importance of the agricultural sector in
generating the necessary demand to promote industrialization. In contrast, the present paper
elaborates the idea that growth is driven by industrial R&D.
The importance of a hierarchic structure of demand is also emphasized by Eswaran
and Kotwal (1993). If initially workers are too poor to buy manufacturing goods, productivity
progress in the manufacturing sector will not trickle down and real wages cannot grow. A
5more even distribution of wealth as well as openness to international trade are mechanisms to
escape underdevelopment. Baland and Ray (1991) consider a situation where a highly
unequal distribution of assets generates a high demand for luxury goods. Since basic goods
and luxuries are produced by the same resources, unemployment limits the demand for basic
goods and allows to cover a high demand for luxuries. Like that of Murphy, Shleifer, Vishny
(1989a) these papers stick to a static framework. Income distribution has an impact on the
level of income, but no effect on the rate of growth.4
Only recently has the literature begun to analyze the impact of income inequality and
hierarchic demand on growth. Chou and Talmain (1996) highlight mechanisms also present in
the current model. Their consumers have preferences over a standard commodity (‘leisure’)
and goods produced in a Grossman and Helpman-type innovation sector. If the demand for
‘leisure’ is not linear in income, inequality affects growth. In the model of Chou and Talmain
(1996) new goods are always consumed by all, rich and poor consumers. In contrast, I study
the potentially important case in which not all consumers can afford an innovator’s good. As a
consequence not only the level, but also the time path of demand is affected by the
distribution of income. Furthermore, in Chou and Talmain (1996) the equilibrium is always
unique, whereas my model generates multiple equilibria. Also Falkinger (1994) studies the
impact of income distribution on product development when consumers have a hierarchic
structure of demand. He finds that the impact of income inequality on growth depends on the
type of technological spillovers (innovations versus learning-by-doing). In this model firms
live only for one period whereas in my model innovators live forever. This allows me to study
the behavior of innovators who have to consider how demand develops over time.
In the above papers income distribution affects the level of demand, but has no impact
on the prices of new goods. The papers by Glass (1996), Li (1996), and Zweimüller and
Brunner (1996, 1998) are complementary to the present paper because of their focus on
prices. Within a quality ladder framework inequality has an impact on the incentives to
6innovate by affecting the willingness to pay for quality. The equilibrium price structure
among goods of different qualities is affected by the income distribution.
This paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the model and section 3 studies
the innovation decision in detail. Section 4 studies the general equilibrium and analyzes the
relationship between inequality and growth. In these sections the focus will be on regime (a)
and on a situation where there are only two groups of consumers, rich and poor. Section 5
first studies the remaining regimes (b) and (c) and then extends the model to a general
distribution. Section 6 concludes.
2. The model
2.1 Technology, market structure, and prices
Consider a closed economy. At date t, many different consumer goods are supplied with labor
as the unique production factor. Goods are produced either by a an efficient modern or by a
less efficient traditional technology. The less efficient technology is freely available and
requires ( )a tc  labor units to produce one unit of output. A market which is served by these
low-tech producers has perfect competition. In equilibrium the price is equal to marginal
costs. Marginal costs are ( ) ( )w t a tc , where ( )tw  is the wage rate. Production of each good
requires the same labor input, so all goods have the same price. I will normalize this price to
unity. The wage rate is then ( ) ( )w t a tc= 1 .
Access to the modern technology requires a fixed R&D labor input ( )a tr . Output can
then be produced with a unit input ( )a tm . The modern technology is more efficient meaning
that ( ) ( )a t a tc m>  for all t. If production takes place with the efficient technology, the market
is served by a single monopolist.5 Potential competition comes from the competitive fringe.
7To keep this competitors from the market no monopolist ever charges a price larger than 1. It
is assumed, that no monopolist ever charges a price below 1.6 Under these conditions a
monopolistic firm earns a profit ( ) ( ) ( )π t w t a tm= −1  per unit of output.
2.2 Consumers
Consumers have hierarchic preferences. The hierarchy is captured by an index j. A low-j good
satisfies a basic need, higher-j goods satisfy more luxurious wants. Goods are indivisible and
consumption is a take-it-or-leave-it decision. A consumer derives utility 1 when consuming a
good [ ]1,0∈j  and derives utility 1 j  when consuming a good ( )j ∈ ∞1, .
Given that all prices are unity, consumer i will buy good j when the utility from
consumption is larger than the marginal utility of income, denoted by ( )λ i t . I will assume
that ( )λ i t < 1 for all i and t. This means everybody can afford the menu [ ]0 1, .7 Moreover,
consumer i buys a good j > 1 if ( )λ i t j≤ 1 . The range of consumed goods is then ( )[ ]tci,0
where ( )c ti  satisfies ( ) )(1 tct ii =λ . ( )c ti  is not only a measure for the level of consumption
but also for the most luxurious good purchased by consumer i. The instantaneous utility ( )u ti
can now be represented as  ( ) ( )( )
( )
u t dj
j
dj c ti i
ci t
= + = +∫∫ 1 1
10
1
ln .  It is assumed that consumers
have an infinite horizon. Their objective function is then
( ) ( )( )[ ]U u t e dt c t e dti i t i t= = +−
∞
−
∞∫ ∫θ θ
0 0
1 ln , (1)
where θ  denotes the rate of time preference. Each consumer earns a wage ( )w t  and owns
assets ( )A ti  in period t. There is a perfect capital market with interest rate r. Only steady
8states will be considered. So r is constant over time. Consumers have perfect foresight and
make their choices given the rate of wage growth g which is also constant. The lifetime
budget constraint can then be written as
( ) ( )∫ ∫
∞ ∞
−−− +≤
0 0
00 dtewAdtetc
tgr
i
rt
i , (2)
where w0  and Ai0  are initial wages and assets, respectively. In the steady state also assets and
consumption grow at rate g. Moreover, the consumption path is given by the following
relations
θ−= rg , (3)
( ) 000 ii Awc θ+= . (4)
Equation (3) results from the fact that preferences are logarithmic in the number of consumed
goods. According to equation (4), the level of consumption is the sum of labor income and a
fraction of assets equal to the rate of time preference. As in Bertola (1993), the propensity to
consume from labor income (the non-accumulated factor) is unity, whereas the propensity to
consume from asset income (the accumulated factor) is lower than one. Current income of
household i is ( ) ( )w t rA ti+  and savings are ( )gA ti . This means that wealthier households
have a higher savings rate.
2.3 The distribution of wealth
9To keep things simple, I will first focus on a two-class society with rich (R) and poor (P)
consumers. (Section 5 extends the analysis to more general distributions). Consumers of
group R  and P  have equal preferences and earn the same wage but own different wealth
levels. Denoting by L the size of the population and by β  the group share of the poor, we
have Lβ  poor and ( )Lβ−1  rich consumers. Furthermore, let di  be the ratio of the value of
assets owned by household i relative to the average. Poor consumers own less, so 10 <≤ Pd .
Rich consumers own more, so 1>Rd . The corresponding fractions in aggregate wealth are
Pdβ  for the poor and ( ) Rdβ−1  for the rich. These two terms must sum up to 1 and one can
solve for ( ) ( ) 111 >β−β−= PR dd . Consequently, inequality decreases in Pd  and increases
in β  (holding Pd  constant).
Aggregate wealth consists of firm shares. These firms earn a flow profit and the value
of a firm  k, ( )v tk , equals the present value of this flow profit. The value of wealth in the
economy ( )tV  is then the aggregate value of firms, that is the integral of ( )v tk  over the
interval ( )[ ]0,n t  where n(t) is the measure of existing firms. The value of assets of consumer i
is then
( ) ( )A t d V t Li i= . (5)
2.4 Technical progress and the resource constraint
Technical progress is the result of innovations. As in most endogenous growth models, it is
assumed that researchers of future generations build upon experience of previous innovations.
Moreover, it is assumed that also the efficiency of final output production, by both modern
firms and the traditional competitive fringe, increases in previous innovations (see also Young
10
(1993)). In this model firms live forever, so the number of previous innovations equals the
number of existing firms ( )n t . More specifically, I assume
( ) ( )tnata ll =    for   l r c m= , , , (6)
where the la 's are positive constants.
Total labor supply in the economy is L . The real wage is given by the marginal
product in the competitive fringe, fixed at any date t. The full employment equilibrium is
established by an appropriate allocation of labor across sectors. Part of the work force is
employed in the R&D sector to develop new processes, the remaining part is employed in
modern or in low-tech firms to produce consumer goods. If ( )tn  measures innovation
activities in t, the number of R&D employees is  ( ) ( )tatn r . Let ( )tYm  denote total production
in the monopolistic sector, then ( ) ( )tatY mm  is employment in modern manufacturing. Total
output by the competitive fringe is ( )tYc , so ( ) ( )tatY cc  workers are employed in the
competitive fringe. The labor market equilibrium condition can then be written as
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )tatYtatYtatnL ccmmr ++=  .
Above it was shown that the rich consume all goods in the range ( )[ ]tcR,0 , whereas
the poor buy the menu ( )[ ]tcP,0 , with ( ) ( )tctc PR > . Suppose that the modern firms supply
the menu ( )[ ]tn,0 . The firm producing good ( )tn  is the most recent innovator. The following
analysis will be made under the assumption that a new innovator sells initially to the rich, but
not to the poor (regime (a)). This means that ( ) ( ) ( )tctntc RP << . The poor buy only a subset
of goods produced in modern manufacturing and will buy no goods produced in the
competitive sector. The rich buy all goods produced in modern manufacturing plus other
goods. Any additional demand from the rich is satisfied by the competitive fringe. Output in
11
the monopolistic sector is then ( ) ( ) ( )( )LtnLtctY Pm β−+β= 1 . Output in the competitive sector
is given by ( ) ( ) ( )[ ]( )LtntctY Rc β−−= 1 . In a steady state, ( )n t , ( )c tP , and ( )c tR  grow at the
same rate g. Using equation (6) and defining ( ) ( )x c t n ti i= , i=R,P, the resource balance
condition can be written as
( )[ ] ( )( )L a g a x L a x Lr m P c R= + − + + − −1 1 1β β β . (7)
3. Innovations
3.1 Demand and the value of a firm
The value of a firm depends on its profit flow. The profit margin is constant over time and
equal across firms. To see this recall that all prices are equal to 1 and all unit costs can be
written as ( ) ( )a t w t a am m c= (using (6) and ( ) ( )w t a tc= 1 ). Profits per unit of output are then
( ) cmc aaa −=π . The level of demand, however, is different across firms and changes over
time. Demand for a monopolistic firm supplying good j, ( )D tj , is given by
( )D t Lj =              if   ( )0 ≤ ≤j c tP , or
( ) ( )D t Lj = −1 β    if   ( ) ( )c t j n tP < ≤ .
Goods ( )[ ]j c tP∈ 0,  are purchased by all consumers. Firms supplying such a good have a
fully developed market. All consumers buy today and at all dates in the future, so demand is
at its maximum and stays there forever. Thus the value of such a firm is also constant and
given by
12
( ) ( ) rLdtetDtv rtjj π=π= ∫∞ −0 .
Goods in the interval ( ])(),( tntcP  are too luxurious for poor people. They are only bought by
the rich. As incomes grow also the poor will be able to afford that good. The initial period
when only rich consumers buy will be short, if the incomes of the poor grow very quickly.
And it will also be short, if the current consumption level of the poor is already high. Denote
the length of that period by ∆t . Obviously, ∆t  is defined by the equation ( )c t t jP + =∆ . Since
( )c tP grows at rate g, I can write ( ) jetc tgP =∆ . Solving for ∆t  yields
( ) ( )( )jtcgt Pln1−=∆ . Obviously, ∆t  is increasing in g and decreasing in ( )tcP .  The value
of a firm supplying a good ( ])(),( tntcj P∈  can be written as8
( ) ( ) ( )[ ] ( ) ( )[ ][ ]grPtrrtjj jtcrLerLdtetDtv β+β−π=β+β−π=π= ∆−∞ −∫ 110 .
While the level of demand makes a discrete jump when the poor start to buy, the value of a
firm increases smoothly over time. The cash flow to be earned from the poor has to be
discounted. From the above equation, the discount factors equals ( )[ ] 1<grP jtc . Clearly,
discounting depends on the distance between the most luxurious good currently purchased by
the poor, ( )tcP , and the good under consideration, j. When consumption grows this gap
decreases and thus the discount factor increases smoothly. Consequently, also the firm value
grows smoothly and reaches rLπ  as soon as the poor can afford good j.
3.2 The entry decision
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Entering a market is profitable as long as the necessary R&D costs are not larger than the
reward to an innovation. The R&D costs are ( ) ( )a t w t a ar r c=  (using (6) and ( ) ( )w t a tc= 1 )
and are constant over time. The reward to an innovation equals the present value of the
subsequent profit flow. Denote by n(t) the good supplied by the most recent innovator.
Replacing  j by ( )tn  in the above expression for ( )v tj , and using the definition
( ) ( )tntcx PP = , the value of the most recent innovator is equal to
( ) ( )[ ]grPn xrLtv β+β−π= 1 .
With free access to the R&D technology the equilibrium is characterized by zero
profits, that is by the condition ( )tvaa ncr ≥ , with equality when g>0. Using (3) and the
above expression for ( )tvn  the zero-profit equilibrium can be expressed as
( )( ) ( ) ( )[ ]ggPcr xLaag θ+β+β−π≥θ+ 1 , or   ( ) ( )PxgBgC ,≥ (8)
The left hand side of (8) are the current costs of innovating ( )C g : the interest cost of
investing in a new firm. In equilibrium these costs must not be smaller than the current
returns from an innovation ( )B g xP, . These returns consist of dividends resulting from sales
to the rich ( )1−β πL  plus the increase in the firm value, ( )( )β π θL xP g g+ .
Figure 1 draws both sides of equation (8) against g. ( )C g  is a straight line with slope
a ar c  and intercept ( )θ a ar c .  The innovation costs are increasing in g because in
equilibrium a higher growth rate goes hand in hand with a higher interest rate (see equation
(3)). ( )B g xP,  has the shape of a logistic curve. It equals ( )1−β πL  for g = 0 , is convex over
the range ( )[ ]g xP∈ −0 2, ln θ , and concave for ( )g xP≥ − ln θ 2 . For g →∞ , ( )B g xP,
14
approaches  ( )1− +β β πx LP . There are two different effects of  the growth rate on the returns
to an innovation. On the one hand, a rise in g means that the profits from the poor accrue
earlier since their incomes grow faster. This increases the incentive to innovate. On the other
hand, a larger g increases the interest rate: future profits have to be discounted at a higher rate.
This reduces the reward to an innovation. The former effect always dominates the latter
meaning that ( )B g xP,  is increasing in g. But for g → 0 and g →∞  the net effect goes to zero.
The reward to an innovation is not only affected by the growth rate, but also by the
current level of consumption of poor people. If the poor have already a high consumption
level it takes only a short time until they can afford the innovator’s product. This raises the
payoff of an innovation. In Figure 1, a higher xP  means that ( )B g xP,  shifts upwards.
Figures 1a,1b
From the non-linear nature of the ( )B g xP, -curve it follows that the equilibrium might
not be unique. In Figure 1a the rate of time preference is low and satisfies
( ) ( )θ β πa a Lr c < −1 . In this case there may either be a unique equilibrium ( x xP P> 0  or
x xP P<
1 ) or more values of g satisfying the no-entry condition ( x x xP P P
0 1≥ ≥ ). Multiple
equilibria can arise for [ ]x x xP P P∈ 1 0, .9 An equilibrium is ‘stable’ if firms have an incentive to
conduct more R&D when g falls short of the equilibrium value and vice versa. In terms of
Figure 1, in a stable equilibrium the cost-line cuts the benefit-curve from below.10
Denote by ( ) ( )g L a ar c≡ − −1 β π θ  and ( )g L a ar c≡ −π θ  respectively the lower
and the upper bound of the range of possible growth rates. Then three regions of g can be
distinguished: (i) ( )g g g∈ , 0 , (ii) [ ]g g g∈ 0 1, , and (iii) ( )g g g∈ 1,  . Intersections in the first
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and in the third interval the stability condition is satisfied. The C-line is steeper than the B-
curve at points of intersection. An increase in xP  will always lead to an increase in g. In the
second interval, the stability condition is violated. The C-line cuts the B-curve from above.
An increase in xP  leads to a fall in g.
In Figure 1b the rate of time preference is larger and satisfies ( ) ( )θ β π≥ −1 L a ar c .
There are at most two equilibria with positive values of g ( x xP P≥
2 ). In that case, also g = 0
satisfies the zero-profit condition (benefits are not higher than costs). The interesting intervals
are (i) the single point g=0, (ii) ( ]g g∈ 0 1, , and (iii) ( )g g g∈ 1,  . Again intersections in
intervals (i) and (iii) are stable, in (ii) unstable.
4. Growth and income distribution
4.1 Equilibrium growth rates
The last section was concerned with the equilibrium innovation rate taking consumption as
given (equation (8)). The general equilibrium has to consider in addition which combination
of growth and consumption is feasible given the economy’s resource constraint (equation (7)).
And it has to take into account that consumption choices are optimal given the households’
preferences. Denote the average value of all modern firms by ( ) ( )v V t n t= 11 and using
equations (4), (5), and ( ) ( )w t a tc= 1  the optimal level of consumption of consumer i can be
expressed as
Lvdax ici θ+=1 (9)
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Equations (7) - (9) form a system of 4 equations with 4 unknowns: xP  and xR , g, and v . I will
now discuss the solution to this system. Substituting equation (9) into the resource constraint
(7) and using ( )π = −a a ac m c , it is straightforward to calculate
( )
( )v
L a g a a
d
c r c
P
=
− + −
−
π β β
θ β π
1
1
. (10)
This is the average firm value consistent with full employment and optimal choices by all
consumers.
Now I can determine the equilibrium growth rate, g*. Solving equation (8) for xP  and
setting the resulting expression equal to the value of xP  from (9) using (10) implicitly defines
g*. This yields
( )( ) ( ) ( )
( )
g a a L
L a
d
L a g a a
L d
r c
g
g
c
P
c r c
P
* *
*
*+ − −



= +
− + −
−
+θ β π
β π
π β β
β π
θ1 1 1
1
.       (11)
Equation (11) holds ( )( ) ( )g a a Lr c*+ > −θ β π1 . If this is not satisfied, g*=0. Moreover, there
may be more than one value of g satisfying (11).
It is convenient to draw both sides of equation (11) in ( )Pxg, -space. The left-hand-
side satisfies the no-profit condition. This is the “N-curve” (Figure 2). Values of Px  equal to
the right-hand-side satisfy the resource constraint. This is the “R-curve” (Figure 3). The shape
of the N-curve follows from the discussion in section 3. If the zero-profit equilibrium is
unique for all values of Px  the N-curve has a positive slope: more consumption by the poor
Px  makes innovation more profitable. The result is a higher level of R&D activities, that is a
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higher g. The R-curve has a negative slope: more consumption by the poor means that more
resources are needed for the production of consumer goods. This leaves less resources for
R&D.
The intention of this paper is to analyze the impact of inequality on growth. The
parameters of particular interest are therefore the distribution parameters β and dP . Moreover,
the rate of time preference θ  determines whether there exists a unique general equilibrium or
whether multiple equilibria are possible. It is therefore important to know how both the N-
and the R-curve react to changes in these three parameters.
Consider first the N-curve (Figure 2). Points on this curve correspond to intersections
of the B- and the C-curve in Figures 1a and 1b. The N-curve is independent of the distribution
parameter dP , and shifts downwards with decreasing values of  the group share of the poor β .
The solid lines correspond to relatively large β , the dashed line is drawn for a smaller β . The
shift is negligible for xP  close to unity, but becomes larger for smaller xP . The role of  the
rate of time preference θ  is less straightforward. For θ→ 0 the N-curve tends towards a
constant positive slope.12  For ( )θ π≥ L a ar c , innovation is not profitable and the N-curve
coincides with the vertical axis. Figure 2 shows the shape of the N-curve for intermediate
values of θ . For relatively low θ , 0θ  in Figure 2, the N-curve is monotonically increasing.
For larger θ , 1θ  or 2θ  in Figure 2, there may be multiple equilibrium values of g, given xP .
Denote by ( )θ0g  and ( )θ1g  the lower and the upper bound of the interval of g over which the
N-curve has a negative slope. In Figure 2,  if 1θ=θ , this interval is ( ) ( )[ ]1110 , θθ∈ ggg . For
all other g, the no-profit curve slopes upward and satisfies the stability condition. From
section 3 it is clear that if ( ) ( )cr aaLπβ−<θ 1 , ( )g0 θ  is positive, whereas if
( ) ( )cr aaLπβ−≥θ 1 , ( ) 00 =θg  (compare Figures 1a and 1b). The latter case occurs if
2θ=θ  in Figure 2 .
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Figure 2
The R-curve is a straight line which is independent of θ  (Figure 3). If the distribution
parameter dP = 0  this line is horizontal with intercept ca1 on the vertical axis. For dP > 0  the
R-curve has a negative slope. Increasing dP  means a clockwise rotation around the point Q in
Figure 3, that is at cP ax 1=  and ( ) ( )crcQ aaaLg β+β−π= 1 . If the distribution
parameter dP = 0 , a decrease in the population share of the poor β  shifts the point Q to the
right and the R-curve remains otherwise unaffected. If dP > 0 , smaller values of β  lead to a
counter-clockwise rotation around the point S, that is at 1=Px  and
( )[ ] ( )g a d L a aS c P r c= − −π 1 1 . In sum, lower inequality – a higher dP  or a lower β  -
lead to a higher feasible growth rate g for a given level of consumption by the poor Px .
Figure 3
4.2 The impact of inequality on growth
Now we can analyze the central topic of this paper, namely how income inequality affects the
rate of growth. More equality results from a larger Pd  or from a lower β  (holding Pd
constant). By doing comparative statics on these two parameters, the inequality-growth
relationship can be established. I will first study the impact of inequality on growth when the
general equilibrium is unique. I will then discuss multiplicity.
Figure 4
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A unique general equilibrium. Let us first consider the impact of less inequality due to
an increase in the distribution parameter dP . If 0=Pd  the R-curve in Figure 4 is horizontal
and the point E0  is the unique general equilibrium. Increasing Pd  leads to an outward shift of
the R-curve but leaves the N-curve unchanged. In the new equilibrium both the rate of growth
g and the standard of living of poor people Px  ( 1E  in Figure 4) are higher. The reason is a
redirection of aggregate consumer demand towards the more efficient monopolistic sector.
The most luxurious goods consumed by the rich are produced by the competitive fringe
whereas the most luxurious goods consumed by the poor are produced by modern firms. As a
result of redistribution the rich reduce and the poor increase their consumption. This leads to a
situation where a higher proportion of final output is produced in the monopolistic sector so
that production becomes more efficient. This gain in productivity releases resources which
can be employed in the R&D sector. In the new equilibrium g and  Px  are higher whereas Rx
is lower; growth and consumption by the poor increase at the expense of consumption by the
rich. The fact that growth increases means that absolute consumption by the poor ( )tcP
initially jumps to a higher level and has then a steeper path. Consumption by rich people
( )tcR  will initially be smaller but the new path will be above the original one after a finite
period.
Less inequality can also be the result of a lower group share of the poor β . A
reduction in β  shifts both the R-curve and the N-curve outwards. This increases g and but has
an ambiguous impact on Px  ( 2E  in Figure 4). A larger number of rich people makes
innovations more profitable because the size of the market in the early stage of production
becomes larger. This is why the N-curve shifts outwards. At the same time a lower β  (holding
Pd  constant) decreases Rd , leading to a reduction in consumption by the rich. As a result
demand for products of the competitive fringe is reduced and aggregate production becomes
more efficient. This leaves resources for R&D. This is why the R-curve shifts outwards. In
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sum, in the new equilibrium the growth rate g is higher, the impact on the level of
consumption of the poor Px  is ambiguous, and the consumption level of the rich Rx  is lower.
Figures 5a, 5b
Multiple equilibria. A unique general equilibrium requires a sufficiently low rate of
time preference θ . For a larger θ  the N-curve becomes non-monotonic and there is the
possibility of multiple equilibria. In Figure 5a, ( )θ β πa a Lr c < −1  and there are two stable
points at 0=Pd : 0F  and 2F . ( 1F  is unstable). In 0F  the growth rate is low and the size of
the market for the competitive fringe is large, so production is relatively inefficient and a
small amount of resources is devoted to R&D. This is ‘underdevelopment’. 2F  is a long-run
equilibrium where the rich do not excessively consume goods produced by the competitive
fringe. More workers are available for research and growth is high. This is ‘prosperity’.
Multiple equilibria arise in this model because innovation activities of present and
future innovators are complementary. If current innovators expect high innovation activities
of future generations they have an incentive to conduct more R&D. This complementarity is
due to technological spillovers. A higher level of R&D activities generates a higher growth
rate. And a higher growth rates leads to a more rapid development of an innovator’s market.
In other words, a higher expected innovation rate creates a positive demand externality that
makes present innovations more profitable. Multiple equilibria are the result of a coordination
problem in which the expectation about the future innovation rate determines whether the
economy experiences high or low growth. The economy will be trapped in underdevelopment
0F  if agents are pessimistic and expect low growth. The prosperity path 2F  would be feasible
but a coordination failure is present. There is no possibility to synchronize expectations. 13 No
agent has a reason to expect high growth when all others are pessimistic.
21
If an economy is trapped in underdevelopment 0F  redistribution can change the
situation. Less inequality as a result of an increase in Pd  can make the underdevelopment
regime infeasible. In terms of Figure 5a an increase in Pd  leads to a clockwise rotation of the
R-curve around point Q, and leaves the N-curve unaffected. Small changes in Pd  will lead to
movements along the underdevelopment-trap, but for a PP dd
~
>  the only feasible and stable
equilibrium is the high-growth regime '2F . As a consequence, redistribution can result in a
“Big Push”, a discrete jump in the rate of innovation.
Panel b of Figure 5 corresponds to a situation with a relatively high rate of time
preference θ , that is when ( ) πβ−≥θ Laa cr 1 . In this scenario, zero growth is a stable
equilibrium, 3F  in Figure 5b. This coexists with the high-growth regime 5F  which is also a
stable equilibrium. The point 4F  is unstable. Just like before escaping underdevelopment
through redistribution is possible by a sufficient increase in Pd , so that g=0  is no longer
feasible.
The effect of less inequality due to a decrease in the group share of the poor β  is
straightforward and not shown in Figure 5.  For dP = 0 , a reduction in β  has no effect on xP ,
but increases g. For dP > 0  the effect of a decreasing β  is similar to Figure 5 above. The N-
curve rotates downwards with decreasing β (see also Figure 2), whereas the R-curve rotates
upwards (see Figure 3). When an economy is initially trapped in underdevelopment a
sufficient increase in β can ultimately lead to a situation where the growth rate jumps from a
low to a high growth rate. 
To sum up, this section has shown that less inequality is beneficial for growth. More
inequality leads to a lower growth rate, because the time path of the market size is more
favorable for innovators. Moreover, less inequality may be beneficial for growth by making
an underdevelopment trap infeasible.
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5. The distribution of wealth
The results derived in the previous section refer to a situation with only two groups of
consumers. It was assumed that the products of innovators are initially purchased only by rich
people (regime (a)). In this section I will first discuss the conditions under which such an
equilibrium exists and discuss possible other regimes with two consumer groups (regimes (a)
and (b)). I will then turn to the general case with more types of consumers.
5.1 Existence of the various regimes
Regime (a). If the rich but not the poor buy the innovator’s product, RP xx <<1 . To see
under which circumstances these conditions are met, consider equation (9). To ensure that
poor people do not buy the innovator’s product 1<Px , two conditions have to be satisfied.
First, the wage rate has to be sufficiently low. This means that 11 <ca . Secondly, the poor
must have little wealth, that is dP  has to be small enough. To ensure that the rich buy all n(t)
goods of monopolistic producers 1>Rx , wealth ownership of the rich Rd  must be large
enough. Since )1()1( β−β−= PR dd  is increasing in β  and goes to infinity as β  approaches
1,  there exists a β  generating a large enough Rd . In sum, low wages and a sufficiently
unequal wealth distribution are a necessary and sufficient condition for regime (a).
Regime (b). If the rich and the poor can buy all goods produced by modern firms we
have 1>> PR xx  (regime (b)). In that case the innovation equilibrium condition (8)
simplifies to ( ) π=θ+ Laag cr . Using ( )π = −a a ac m c , the equilibrium growth rate can be
expressed as θ−−= rmc aLaag )(* .
14 In that case income distribution does not affect
growth. The reason is that demand for an innovator does no longer depend on the distribution
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of income. Demand is at the maximum when this firm enters the market and stays there
forever. Since demand does not change through redistribution, the incentives to innovate
remain also unaffected. A similar reasoning holds for the resource constraint. The most
luxurious goods purchased by the rich and the poor are produced by the competitive fringe.
Redistribution changes the structure of this consumption, but leaves the overall level of
production in the competitive sector unchanged. The allocation of resources remains
unaffected by the income distribution and growth remains constant.
Regime (b) requires that the poor can afford all n(t) goods produced in the
monopolistic sector. Using (9) and the fact that in regime (b) all firms have the same value,
namely cr aa , the condition 1>Px  can be written as ( ) 111 >θ+ Lada rPc . This
condition is always satisfied when 1/1 >ca , that is when the wage rate is large enough. If the
wage rate is lower, a high ownership in firm shares Pd , a high rate of time preference θ
and/or large set-up costs relative to the market size Lar  guarantee that the poor will
consume all goods of the modern sector.  Finally, a situation where rich and poor buy all
goods in the modern sector is feasible if production in this sector is efficient enough. When all
L households buy all n(t) goods labor demand in that sector is Lam . Since labor supply
equals L  we must have 1<ma  so that additional resources remain available for the
competitive sector and the R&D sector.15
Regime (c). Regime (c) occurs if neither the poor nor the rich can afford an innovator’s
product. In that case the competitive sector has no demand and all consumption is satisfied by
modern firms. The resource constraint (7) can then be rewritten as
LxagaL mr +=  (7’)
24
where RP xxx )1( β−+β=  denotes the average consumption level. Moreover, applying the
arguments used in section 3.1, it is straightforward to demonstrate that the zero-profit
equilibrium condition (8) changes to
( ) ( ) ggggPggRcr xLxxLaag )()()()1( θ+θ+θ+ π>β+β−π=θ+ (8’)
where the last relation follows from Jensen’s inequality.
To understand the inequality growth-relationship in regime (c) it is useful to start from
a situation where all consumers are equal. In that case we can draw the R-curve and the N-
curve in (g, x ) space with x  playing a similar role than xP  in section 4 (Figure 6). Just like
before the R-curve slopes down and for sufficiently low θ  the N-curve slopes up. In this case
the equilibrium is unique ( 0G in Figure 6).  Now consider a spread in the wealth distribution.
This leaves the R-curve unaffected. The rich increase and the poor decrease their consumption
equally. Since all concerned goods are produced in the modern sector, the amount of
resources necessary to produce that consumption are the same. The N-curve, however, shifts
down. The right-hand-side of equation (8’) measures the current reward from an innovation
and this reward increases when income distribution becomes more dispersed. The reason is
that innovators are better off when profits are less ‘backloaded’. An innovator prefers a small
payoff early in life to a larger payoff later on. This is a result of discounting. Hence in regime
(c) inequality is beneficial for growth.
Regime (c) requires that even the rich cannot afford all n(t) goods produced in the
monopolistic sector. The highest possible average firm value v  is given by θπ /L . This is
when the highest possible payoff stream πL  is realized and the interest rate is at the lowest
possible level θ  (see equation (3)). Using (9) and substituting θπ= // Lv  gives the highest
possible value of .Rx  To ensure that this upper limit for Rx  is smaller than unity we must
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have ( ) 11)1( <π+ Rc da .  This condition holds for a low enough wage rate, 1/1 <ca ,  low
enough asset holdings by the rich Rd  and a limited mark-up of monopolistic firms π .
5.2 More groups of consumers
Now suppose there are many different types ( )Kki ,...,,...,1= , ranked by wealth, so that a
higher i indexes a type with more assets. Denote by k the number of types who are too poor to
purchase all ( )tn  products in the modern sector. The remaining kK −  types can afford more
than ( )tn  goods. I will refer to the first k types as the group of ‘poor’ consumers and to the
remaining K-k types as the group of the ‘rich’. The aim is to study the impact of within-group
inequality and between-group inequality on growth.
Assume first that 1=k  but 2>− kK . We have now more than two types of rich
consumers and in addition to one group who does not buy the innovator’s product. Which
effect has redistribution within the rich group? In regime (b) we have seen that redistribution
has no impact on the growth rate if all concerned consumers can afford all goods produced by
the monopolistic sector. This result carries over to the general case. Such a redistribution
leaves the demand for the innovator unchanged and has no impact on the resources necessary
to satisfy the same aggregate level of consumption. As a result, redistribution within the rich
group has no impact on growth.
Now consider the general case when there are many poor types. Denote by βi  is the
share of type i in the population and by β the group share of the poor,  with β=β∑
=
k
i i1 . The
average level consumption among poor households is then ( )∑
=
ββ= ki iiP xx 11 .
Moreover, the average poor type owns wealth ( ) LvdLvd ki iiP ∑ = ββ= 11 . The R-curve
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remains the same as before (replace Px  and Rx  by Px  and Rx  equation (7)).  However,
the N-curve now changes to
( )( ) ( ) ( )( )[ ] ( ) ( )[ ]ggpki ggiicr xLxLaag θ+= θ+ +β−π≥β+β−π=θ+ ∑ 11 1  . (8’’)
The last relation is again due to Jensen’s inequality. What is the impact of redistribution
within the poor? This is a generalization of regime (c) above and we can apply similar
arguments. The resource constraint remains unaffected. Redistribution changes the
composition but not aggregate demand by the monopolistic sector. However, a more
dispersed income distribution among the poor types is more favorable for innovators. It leads
the a time path of demand which is less backloaded. As a result the discounted value of the
innovator’s profit flow increases. It follows that more inequality within the poor group is
beneficial for growth.
So far, we have focused on the impact of  inequality within groups. It remains to
discuss the affect of redistribution between these groups. This is generalization of regime (a),
discussed at length in the previous sections. In that case Px , Pd  and β play exactly the same
role as in sections 2 – 4, and the above reasoning can be applied in a straightforward way.
This means that more inequality between groups is harmful for growth.
Now the growth-maximizing wealth distribution can be characterized. This is the
wealth distribution which maximizes the demand of the most recent innovator. Depending on
the efficiency of production in the monopolistic sector, there are two possible scenarios. If
productivity in the monopolistic sector is very high, the outcome is a wealth distribution such
that even the poorest can afford all goods produced in the monopolistic sector.16 The
alternative scenario arises if productivity in the monopolistic sector is low, so that a situation
where all consumers buy all goods produced in the monopolistic sector is not feasible. In this
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case the wealth distribution which maximizes growth is such that only a part of  the
consumers has enough wealth to consume all goods in the monopolistic sector, but does not
consume goods from the competitive fringe. The other part of the consumers has no assets
and earns only wage income.
6. Conclusions
When consumers have hierarchic preferences the structure and the dynamics of demand are
affected by the distribution of income. Poor people consume more basic goods, whereas rich
people direct their expenditure to more luxurious goods. The long-run growth rate depends on
the distribution of income because it affects the time path of demand faced by an innovator.
How a change in income inequality affects the long-run growth rate depends on the
consumption capacity of the consumer s concerned by the redistribution. First, a redistribution
from consumers who can afford the good supplied by the most recent innovator to consumers
who cannot afford this good leads to an increase in the growth rate. The reason is that after
such a redistribution the market of an innovator grows faster  which increases the incentive to
innovate. Secondly, if redistribution among consumers who can afford the most recent
innovator’s product has no effect on the growth rate. This is because the level and the
dynamics of demand for an innovator remain unaffected. Finally, redistribution from poor
households to even poorer households both of whom cannot afford the most recent
innovator’s product reduces the growth rate. This is because innovators are increasingly
worse off when a given profit flow is shifted towards the future.
The model may generate multiple steady-state equilibria. With a sufficiently unequal
distribution and a sufficiently high rate of time preference two identical economies can end up
in different growth regimes. In one regime the growth rate is high, and few resources are
devoted to the inefficient competitive sector. In another regime, the competitive sector has
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high demand and R&D activities remain on a low level. Multiple equilibria are the result of a
complementarity between present and future R&D activities. If current innovators expect a
high future innovation rate they have an incentive to conduct more R&D today. This
complementarity is the result of the fact that innovations drive growth and that the economy-
wide growth rate has a positive impact on the evolution of an innovator’s market.
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Figure 1a: Zero Profit Equilibria
1 − β( )Lπ >θar / ac
g
1 − β + βxpo( )Lπ
1 − β + βxp2( )Lπ
1 − β( )Lπ
θar / ac
B g, xp
1( )
ggog

B g, xp
0( )
C g( )
Lπ
g1
30
Figure 1b: Zero Profit Equilibria
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Figure 2: The N-curve
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Figure 3: The R-curve
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Figure 4: A unique general equilibrium
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Figure 5a: Multiple steady states
θar / ac < 1 − β( )Lπ
xp
F1
R dp = ˜ d p( )
R dp = 0( )
g
Q
N
1
ac
F0 F2
F2
′
35
Figure 5b: Multiple steady states
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Figure 6: Equlibrium in Regime (c)
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1 For recent surveys on income distribution and growth see Benabou (1996), Aghion and
Howitt (1998, chapters 9 and 10), and Bertola (forthcoming).
2 See Jackson (1984) for direct evidence in favor of hierarchical structure of demand.
Falkinger and Zweimüller (1996) provide similar evidence using aggregate consumption data
from the International Comparison Project of the UN.
3 It is interesting to note that the results in this paper encompass the results of two different
papers by Murphy, Shleifer, and Vishny (1989a,b). In their “Big Push” paper, multiple
equilibria are essential, but income inequality plays no role. In the paper on market size and
income distribution, multiple equilibria cannot arise. In contrast, the conditions for multiple
equilibria in my paper include a sufficient degree of inequality. Matsuyama (1993) studies
multiple equilibria in a dynamic version of the “Big Push”. Contrary to the present paper,
multiple equilibria are driven by history, rather than by expectations and inequality-effects are
not studied.
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4 See also Bourguignon (1990) for a static model of a dual economy where income
distribution affects the equilibrium outcome because the composition of demand varies across
income classes.
5 The absence of imitators of the modern technology could be due to patent protection or
some fixed imitation cost with ex-post Bertrand-competition.
6 This will be an equilibrium outcome if reducing prices below one does not attract many
additional consumers, that is if the price elasticity of demand is sufficiently low. The demand
curve mirrors the income distribution, so the assumption in the text puts a restriction on the
parameters of the distribution. In the special case with two groups there are always some
firms with an incentive for price-cutting in the initial phase of the product cycle when
additional consumers can be attracted. However, the two-group case serves illustrative
purposes and the results carry over to the case of a general distribution in a straightforward
way.
7 This assumption puts a restriction on initial conditions. From the first-order condition to
maximizing equation (1) subject to (2) (see below) we must have ( ) ( )tct ii 1=λ , so
( ) ( )tt PR λ<λ , and ( )tiλ will decrease at the same rate as ( )tci increases. In equilibrium
consumption is ( ) ( ) ( )tAtwtc ii θ+=  and the wage rate is ( ) ( ) catntw =  (see equations (4) and
(6)). Hence, ( ) 1<λ ti  for all i and t requires ( ) can >0 .
8 If the firm produces a good ( )tcj R> , analogous arguments as above lead to a value
( ) ( )( ) ( )( ) ( )( )[ ]grPgrRj jtcjtcrLtv β+β−π= 1 .
9 The possibility of multiple equilibria depends on the curvature of the B-function. If θ→0,
the B-curve becomes a horizontal line, independent of g, and the equilibrium will be unique.
It is instructive to consider necessary and sufficient conditions for an upward sloping N-curve
for all g and cP ax 1≥ . From Figure 1a, a unique zero-profit equilibrium for cP ax 1=
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implies uniqueness for cP ax 1> . A necessary condition for uniqueness when cP ax 1=  is
( )θ β πa a Lr c < −1 . A sufficient condition is ( )( ) ( )~g a a Lr c+ < −θ β π1  where %g  is the rate
of growth where the ( )B a gc1 , -curve has its steepest slope. It is straightforward to verify that
( )~ lng ac= θ 2 . The sufficient condition is then ( )( )θ
β π
a a
L
ar c c
<
−
+
1
1 2ln
.
10 Differentiating both sides of (8) with respect to g yields the ‘stability’ condition:
( ) ( )a a x g L xr c P P g g> − +ln θ β π θ2 .
11 Using the definition of ( )V t  and the expression for the value of a firm )(tv j  derived in
section 3.1, it is straightforward to show that ( )V t  grows at the same rate as ( )n t  so that v is
constant over time.
12 0=θ  can serve only as a benchmark. In this case the integral in (1) is not defined and
1>Rx does not hold.
13 For a discussion of path-dependent versus expectation-determined equilibria see Krugman
(1991) and Matsuyama (1991).
14 An alternative way to solve for the equilibrium growth rate uses the resource constraint (7).
Substituting (9) into (7) making use of the fact that cr aav = when 1>Px  yields the
expression for g* in the text.
15 This is a necessary but not a sufficient condition. If inequality is very large demand by the
rich for goods produced by competitive firms is high. In that case  ma  has to be significantly
below unity so that the remaining resources, Lam )1( − , can satisfy the demand for these other
goods.
16 When all consumers buy all n(t) goods in the monopolistic sector, the resulting labor
demand is Lam . A necessary condition is therefore 1<ma .
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